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Abstract
In public sector procurement, social welfare often depends on the time taken to
complete the contract. A leading example is highway construction, where slow comple-
tion times inict a negative externality on commuters. Recently, highway departments
have introduced innovative contracting methods that give contractors explicit time in-
centives. We characterize equilibrium bidding and ecient design of these contracts.
We then gather a unique data set of highway repair projects awarded by the Minnesota
Department of Transportation that includes both innovative and standard contracts.
Descriptive analysis shows that for both contract types, contractors respond to the
incentives as the theory predicts, both at the bidding stage and after the contract
is awarded. Next we build a structural econometric model that endogenizes project
completion times, and perform counterfactual policy analysis. Our estimates suggest
that switching from standard contracts to designs with socially ecient time incen-
tives would increase welfare by over 19% of the contract value; or in terms of the 2009
Mn/DOT budget, $290 million. We conclude that large improvements in social welfare
are possible through the use of improved contract design.
We are grateful to Mn/DOT for data, and to Rabinder Bains, Tom Ravn and Gus Wagner for their
help. We would also like to thank John Asker, Susan Athey, Matt Gentzkow, Ariel Pakes, Chad Syverson
and participants at the IIOC, Stony Brook, NBER IO and WBEC conferences for helpful comments and
suggestions. Jason Kriss, Tina Marsh, Maryam Saeedi and Connan Snider provided excellent research
assistance1 Introduction
It is estimated that approximately 15 percent of world output is accounted for by public
sector procurement. Designing ecient mechanisms for procurement is therefore essential
for guaranteeing the ecient allocation of goods and services. In the United States, auc-
tions are typically used to award procurement contracts to the lowest qualied bidder. In
many contexts, however, social welfare depends upon the time to complete the contract.
Unfortunately, standard procurement mechanisms do not weight expected completion time
in selecting the winning bidder. This suggests that it may be possible to increase social
welfare by including project completion time in the auction design.
We take as a case study the design of time incentives in award procedures for highway pro-
curement. Highway repair generates signicant negative externalities for commuters through
increased gridlock and commuting times. For example, Interstate 35W is a main commuting
route in Minneapolis carrying over 175,000 commuters per day. If a highway construction
project results in a 30 minute delay each way for commuters on this route, the daily social
cost imposed by the construction would be 175,000 hours. If we value time at $10 an hour,
this is a social cost of $1.75 million per day. But in standard highway contracts, contractors
have poor incentives to internalize this externality. For example, highway contractors in
Minnesota pay damages of between $150 and $3500 dollars per day late, depending on the
contract size. Given these weak incentives, it is likely that the observed completion times
will be ineciently slow.
Recently, state highway departments in the US have started to experiment with innovative
auction designs that provide explicit time incentives. The most sophisticated is called A+B
bidding. Here contractors submit a dollar bid for labor and materials, the \A" part, and a
total number of days to complete the project, the \B" part. The bids are scored using both
the A and the B bid and the project is awarded to the contractor with the lowest score. The
winning contractor may also receive incentive payments (disincentives) for completing the
project earlier (later) than the days bid. Standard highway contracts are \A-only" contracts
because they do not weight project completion time in selecting the contractor.
In this paper, we compare these contracts designs both theoretically and empirically. We
start by building a theoretical model of A+B contracts that includes standard A-only con-
tracts and other commonly used contract designs as special cases. We characterize equi-
librium bids and project completion times. The theory shows that for many A+B designs,
1contractors will bid completion times that dier substantially from their internal estimates
of how long it will take. However, by optimally selecting the scoring rule for an A+B auc-
tion, we demonstrate that even with this strategic bidding the observed outcome will be
both ex-ante and ex-post ecient. Our results imply that the more commonly used A-only
contracts will generally result in an ineciently slow project completion time.
In our empirical analysis we build a unique dataset of bids and project completion times for
248 A-only and 29 A+B contracts awarded by the Minnesota Department of Transportation
between 1997-2007. Our data includes detailed information on the progress of the projects,
damages charged for late project completion on A-only contracts, and the scoring rules used
in A + B contracts. We nd that the observed bidding patterns are broadly consistent
with the predictions of our theory. In particular we show that in both A-only and A+B
contracts, bidders respond to the time incentives, adjusting their bids to manipulate the
incentive structure they will face if they win the auction. We also show that time incentives
do work: A+B contracts are completed signicantly faster, at a rate increasing in the weight
given to time in the scoring rule. That said, we nd that for some forms of A+B contracts,
bidders do not behave quite as the theory predicts, suggesting that some designs should in
practice be preferred over others.
Next we propose a method for structurally estimating the contractor's time-related costs.
Our theoretical model implies that the observed project completion time equates the marginal
benet and marginal cost of delay. In A-only contracts, the marginal benet of delay is ex-
ogenously specied by state regulations regarding daily damages for late completion, which
vary with contract size and year. So given this exogenous variation in marginal benets,
we can use the rst order condition to back out the marginal costs. Then having estimated
the structural time cost parameters, we can infer the counterfactual completion time under
dierent incentive structures.
In the nal section of the paper, we estimate the welfare gain to using the ecient auction
mechanism. Our estimates suggest that the welfare gain is large, over 19% of the contract
value in lost surplus in an average contract. Moreover, since budget constraints may be
important in practice, we show that a constrained ecient policy could achieve much of
this gain (8.5% of contract value, or around 145M a year) at relatively low cost to (0.87%
of contract value, or around 14.7M). This motivates our main conclusion, which is that
including stronger time incentives in highway procurement through better contract design
would result in large social welfare improvements.
2This paper is related to four main literatures. There is a literature in engineering on the
role of time incentives in highway procurement (see for example Arditi, Khisty and Yasamis
(1997) and Herbsman, Chen and Epstein (1995)). These papers are primarily descriptive, and
do not provide the counterfactual welfare analysis that we obtain from our richer approach.
The second is the large theoretical literature on optimal procurement (see for example Laf-
font and Tirole (1987), Manelli and Vincent (1995), Branco (1997)). In our analysis of
the A+B auctions, we follow the existing literature on scoring auctions starting with Che
(1993), allowing for multidimensional type as in Asker and Cantillon (2008b)). We focus
on welfare-maximizing, rather than cost-minimizing contract design, thereby avoiding com-
plex multidimensional screening issues | see Asker and Cantillon (2008a) for an analysis
of optimal scoring auctions. We also emphasize the importance of ex-post incentives in
procurement as in Tirole (1986) and Bajari and Tadelis (2001), although the contractual
completeness of the A+B form limits the renegotiation issues emphasized in those papers.
Third, there is a growing empirical literature on auctions with multidimensional attributes.
Krasnokutskaya and Seim (2005) and Marion (2007) consider outcomes from mechanisms
where the contract is not awarded solely based on price. Athey and Levin (2001) and Ba-
jari, Houghton and Tadelis (2007) analyze multidimensional bidding in timber auctions and
highway procurement respectively, emphasizing how the bids determine ex-post behavior.
Finally, our paper is related to earlier work on analysis of bidding for highway contracts
(see Porter and Zona (1993), Hong and Shum (2002), Bajari and Ye (2003), Jofre-Benet and
Pesendorfer (2003), Krasnokutskaya (2004),Li and Zheng (2006), Silva, Dunne, Kankanamge
and Kosmopoulou (2008), Einav and Esponda (2008) and Gil and Marion (2009)).
Section 2 presents an overview of the highway procurement process. Sections 3, 4 and 5
respectively contain the theoretical, empirical and counterfactual policy analysis. Section 6
concludes. All proofs and tables are in the appendix.
2 The Highway Procurement Process
Building or repairing a highway is a complex activity. Here we emphasize key features of the
process that inform our later modeling choices. Figure 1 gives a simple timeline. First, the
state highway department (the \owner") announces the project. Interested bidders may need
to pre-qualify in order to bid, either by submitting a \bidding bond" that will be forfeited if
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Figure 1: Timing of Events in Highway Procurement Process
they win the contract and then don't accept it; or by submitting some form of credentials.
In Minnesota, a bidding bond equal to 5% of the bid suces. Next, the contractors bid on
the contract, according to the bidding rules laid out in the announcement. The contract
is awarded by law to the lowest scoring bidder, so that contractor reputation plays little
role in the process. The winner posts a \contract bond" guaranteeing the completion of the
contract according to specications. This bond is typically secured through a third party
whose will take on the contractor's obligations in the event of default.
Once the contract is awarded, the contractor must plan how to structure the various distinct
activities, such as excavation or grading, that make up the construction project. To do
this, they work out how long each activity will take for a standard crew size, and then use
sophisticated software to work out the optimal sequence to complete the activities in using
the \critical path method" (Clough, Sears and Sears 2005). The key feature of this technique
is that some activities are designated as critical, and must be completed on time to avoid
delay, while others are o the critical path and have some time slack. After doing this, the
contractor compares the time taken to the time allowed under the contract: if the plan would
allow timely completion with a little contingency time on the side, and if there are no time
incentives, then he is done. On the other hand, if there are incentives for quicker completion,
the contractor must undertake cost-benet analysis to determine whether it is worth hiring
additional capital or labor to speed up the process.
Next, the construction begins. During the process, the project engineer conducts random
checks on the quality of the materials and monitors whether everything is completed accord-
ing to the plan specications. Productivity shocks may aect the rate at which any activity
is completed, and the contractor must continually check progress against the planned time
path. If necessary, additional inputs may need to be hired, especially when there is a delay
on a critical path activity. At the end of the process, the contractor is paid the amount bid
less any damages assessed for late completion.
43 Theory
With the above process in mind, we describe a general framework for the analysis of highway
contracts with time incentives. In the model, contractors have multidimensional private costs
that depend both on the cost of materials, and on the time to completion. This reects the
increased labor, rental and subcontracting costs of quick completion. These private costs are
uncertain due to productivity shocks, so that winning contractors may have to adapt their
construction plans after the close of the auction. Bidders compete on both contract price
and on the time to completion, and the contract is awarded on the basis of a scoring rule.
Auction Format: n risk-neutral contractors bid on a highway procurement contract. A
bid is a pair (b;db) indicating the base payment b that the winning contractor will receive,
and the number of days db 2 [0;dE] that the contractor commits to complete the contract
in (the \B-part"). The upper bound dE is the project engineer's estimate of the maximum
time the project should take to complete. The bids are ranked according to the scoring
rule s = s(b;db) = b + cUdb, and the contract is awarded to the contractor with the lowest
score. The constant cU > 0 in the scoring rule is known as the user cost. The contract
also species ex-post incentives: a per day incentive payment cI  0 to be paid when the
winning contractor completes the contract in advance of db, and per day disincentive cD > 0
reducing the winning contractor's base payment when the contractor completes the contract
later than db. We restrict to the case with cI  cD, as is true in all of the contracts we
examine. The three parameters (cU;cI;cD) dene the incentive structure.
Signals and Payos: Losing bidders receive a payo normalized to zero. The winning
contractor has a payo given by:
(b;d
b;d
a;) = b + 1(d
b > d
a)(d
b   d
a)cI   1(d
b < d
a)(d
a   d
b)cD   c(d
a;) (1)
where da is the actual days taken to complete the contract and c(da;) are the input costs
incurred. So his prot is just his bid plus incentive payments (if any), less incentive payments
(if any), less input costs. The cost function c(d;) depends both on how long the contractor
takes and on the realization of a cost parameter  2 Rk, which may depend on productivity
shocks. It is assumed to be twice continuously dierentiable and strictly convex in d for all ,
with limd!0 c0(d;) =  1 and limd!1 c0(d;) > 0. This captures both the idea that slower
completion may lower costs since activities on the critical path need not be accelerated; and
5also that delay eventually becomes costly, since there are daily costs associated with having
labor and capital employed on site.
For example, suppose that the total project cost is the sum of materials, equipment and labor
costs. Equipment is rented at daily rate r. The hourly wage rate w(h) is strictly increasing
and convex in the number of hours h worked per day, due to the cost of overtime. Then if
M and L are the total materials cost and the total labor-hours required on the project, the
contractor will optimally complete the contract at a uniform rate, and we have
c(d;) = M + L w

L
d

+ rd (2)
so that total costs are strictly convex in d, and under mild assumptions on w(), marginal
costs are initially falling in d but then rising.
At the time of bidding, the contractor may be uncertain as to the realization of his private
costs conditional on winning the contract. We assume that each contractor i does not observe
i, but instead receives only a private signal xi 2 Rk aliated with i at the time of bidding.
We assume also that the pairs (xi;i) are independently drawn from some continuous joint
distribution Fi, which has common compact support X for all bidders. Thus the auction
framework ts into the independent private values (IPV) framework, but with the added
complications of a scoring mechanism, ex-post incentives and noisy ex-ante signals.1
Equilibrium: A (Bayes-Nash) equilibrium of the game comprises a set of bidding strategies
(1(x); ;n(x)) of the form i(x) = (bi(x);db
i(x)), that are mutual best-responses; and a
prot maximizing ex-post completion time strategy da(db;) that depends on the days bid
db and the cost realization .
Social Welfare and Eciency: Social welfare is given by W(da;) = V  c(da;) dacS.
It reects the total social value of the highway project V , less the contractor's private costs,
less the social costs imposed on motorists by the construction. The social costs are assumed
to be linear in the days taken, with the daily social cost equal to a constant cS.
We say that a contract design is ex-post ecient if the incentive structure is such that the
contractor chooses da to maximize welfare W for any realization of . A contract design
is ex-ante ecient if the winning bidder is always the bidder who generates the highest
1The IPV assumption is important only for the bidding characterization in Proposition 2; all the other
results will hold for more general information structures.
6expected social welfare E[W(da;)jxi] in equilibrium. These correspond intuitively to pro-
ductive eciency (any contractor to whom the job is given maximizes social welfare) and
allocative eciency (the contract is allocated to the contractor who maximizes social welfare
in expectation).
Examples: Many specic contract designs have been used by local and state transportation
authorities to provide contractors with time incentives. The three most popular such designs
are lane rental, incentive/disincentive contracts, and A+B contracting (Herbsman et al.
1995). In addition, most standard highway contracts provide limited time incentives by
specifying damages that will be charged if the contract nished late. All of these are special
cases of our model.
In lane rental contracts, the winning contractor pays the procurer a daily \lane rental" for
each day taken on the job. The contract is awarded to the lowest bidder. This corresponds in
our model to the case where the bidders are constrained to bid db = 0, and the disincentive
cD is equal to the lane rental.
In incentive/disincentive (I/D) contracts, the contract is awarded solely on the bid amount,
and the target number of days dE is specied by the project engineer, who uses the project
plans to come up with a reasonable completion time. Time incentives are provided by daily
incentive and disincentive payments for nishing early and late, respectively. This is a special
case of our model where the bidders are constrained to bid db = dE.
In standard contracts, as in I/D contracts, the contract is awarded solely on the bid amount,
and the project engineer sets dE. But here there are no positive incentives (cI = 0), and the
disincentives cD are not generally not project specic, being set out in statewide specica-
tions. We have been told that they are set to cover the costs of having the project engineer
out on the site for longer | in other words, they take no account of commuter costs. Again,
this corresponds to our model with the constraint that bidders bid db = dE. Finally, in A+B
contracts, contractors bid both an amount of money and a number of days | this is exactly
the model we set out above.
Discussion: The model includes a number of non-standard features that we believe are
important in thinking about time incentives in procurement. First, it allows for contractors to
have multidimensional private costs, reecting their relative advantages in cheap versus quick
project completion. Second, it allows for ex-ante cost uncertainty, which is extremely realistic
given that contractors routinely have to adjust their plans and thus their cost expectations
7during the contract. In comparing dierent contract designs, it will be important to think
about their eciency in the face of ex-post contractor adaptation.
Nonetheless, we have not modeled a few features that play a role in real-world contracting.
We assume that the project engineer can successfully monitor the construction and ensure
that the nished project meets the contract specications. In this he is aided by the manda-
tory bonding requirements, which limit incentives to shirk on quality. We also abstract away
from the measurement of the number of days taken by the contractor, da. In practice, the
project engineer determines da from the number of work days charged, a measure that takes
into account reasonable delays due to unforeseen weather circumstances, necessary work
stoppages, and change orders. From talking to project engineers, we know that da is to some
extent the outcome of negotiation between the contractor and the project engineer as to
what is fair and reasonable. We assume that contractors are risk neutral, but most results
extend easily to the case of risk aversion. Finally, we do not model the input choices of the
contractor at the beginning of the contract, prior to the resolution of uncertainty. Adding
this would not be hard, but adds additional complexity without changing any of the results.
Later we discuss how this aects the interpretation of our counterfactual results.
Analysis of the Timing Game: Our analysis proceeds by backward induction. First we
analyze the optimal timing choice of a contractor who has won the auction and has learned
his true cost parameter . Next, we consider how contractors will bid in the auction, given
that they will proceed optimally in the timing subgame that follows. Our goal is to assess
the eciency of the diering contract designs.
In Figure 2 we depict the \moving parts" of the timing problem. The left panel depicts
the incentives under a lane rental contract. Each extra day taken costs the contractor cD
in lane rentals, so his marginal cost of delay is just equal to the rental rate. Overtime and
other input costs imply he faces a declining marginal benet of delay, depicted as the curve
 c0(d;) in the gure. Prot maximization requires that he equate the marginal benets
and costs of delay, and so he completes at da.
In the right panel, we show a standard contract. There the project engineer has specied
the target time dE, and each day late incurs damages cD. On the other hand, nishing early
gives no bonus, so the marginal cost of delay jumps discontinuously from cI = 0 to cD > 0 at
dE, as depicted in the picture. Again, the optimal completion time da occurs where  c0(d;)
cuts the step function describing the marginal costs of delay. To formalize this analysis for
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Figure 2: Completion Time in Lane Rentals and Standard Contracts. The gure
depicts the marginal benet to delay  c0(d;) curve and the incentive structure for lane rentals
and standard contracts. In the left panel, lane rental imposes a constant cost of delay cD, so the
contractor optimally completes at da, equating marginal benet and cost of delay. The right panel
depicts a standard contract in which there are no positive incentives, but damages are charged after
the specied completion time, dE. The optimal completion time is da = dE.
the general case, it will be useful to dene an incentive relation I(d;db) that species the
marginal costs of delay to the contractor:
I(d;d
b) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
cI ; d < db
[cI;cD] ; d = dB
cD ; d > db
(3)
Then the optimal completion time will just be where the marginal benet of delay curve
cuts the incentive relation. Also, as the number of days bid db increases, the discontinuous
jump from cI to cD (if any) shifts right, and so the optimal completion time will increase for
some realizations of . We formalize this in a lemma:
Lemma 1 (Optimal Completion Time) The optimal completion time da(db;) is a func-
tion, satisfying  c0(da;) 2 I(da;db) 8db 8. It is (weakly) increasing in db if cI < cD and
constant in db if cI = cD, for any realization of .
Bidding on Time: Next, we consider how the contractor should choose the number of
days to bid db in an A+B contract.2 For any realization of , her incentive payments
IP
 
da(db;);db;

depend entirely on how many days she bid.3 For example, if she bids a
2The contractor has no choice in the other contract designs.
3The incentive payments are IP
 
da(db;);db;

= 1(da > db)(da   db)cD   1(da < db)(db   da)cI.
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Figure 3: Bidding and Stickiness in Completion Time In the left panel, we depict the
gains to bidding db < dE in a A + B contract where cI = 0 < cU = cD, for a particular realization
of . The additional prots from this strategy are shown in the shaded region. In the right panel,
we compare the optimal completion times in standard contracts for dierent realizations of . In
all cases, da = dE, indicating that completion times will be \sticky" at dE in standard contracts.
very low number of days, she will often optimally nish late and pay out damages at rate
cD per day, with incentive payments of  (da(db;)   db)cD. The upside is that she is more
competitive during the bidding stage. To analyze this trade-o, x a desired total score
s = b + cUdb. Substituting out for b in the payo function (1), it follows that the optimal
days bid is:
d
b
i(x) 2 argmin
d
E [c(d
a;)   IP (d
a(d;);d;) + cUdjx] (4)
To see these trade-os graphically, look at the left panel of Figure 3. In this example,
the contractor faces zero positive incentives (cI = 0) and equal user costs and disincentives
(cU = cD). Then it is better for her to bid a low number of days db < dE for any xed s, even
if this results in damages. This allows her to increase the A-part of her bid by (dE   db)cU,
holding s xed. On the other hand, she pays out (da   db)cD = (da   db)cU in damages,
and also incurs additional private costs
R dE
da  c0(s;)ds = c(da;)   c(dE;). This leaves the
shaded region as increased prots.
For certain incentive structures, it always pays to bid a \very low" or \very high" number of
days. To formalize this, it will be helpful to dene a lower and upper bound on the completion
times. Dene d = inffd : 9 :  c0(d;) = cDg and similarly d = supfd : 9 :  c0(d;) = cIg.4
A contractor will never want to complete before d because his marginal private costs always
exceed cD > cI before that point. Similar logic shows he will never complete after d. Then
we have the following result:
4If cI = 0, the upper bound may not exist, but then the case in proposition 2 below won't arise.
10Lemma 2 (Bidding on Time) In equilibrium, if cI < cD  cU, the contractor bids db  d.
If cU  cI < cD, the contractor bids db   d. If cI = cU = cD the contractor is indierent
among all choices of db. Finally, if cI < cU < cD, the days bid is db = db
i(x) 2 (d;d),
decreasing in cU, increasing in cI and cD.
This is intuitive. If cI = cU = cD, incentives are completely at regardless of the days bid,
so the contractor is indierent. On the other hand if positive incentives are low, as in the
left panel of Figure 3, it is protable to bid as few days as you could reasonably expect to
complete the contract in, to \lock-in" a bonus for nishing early. Finally, if the usercost
is in-between the positive and negative incentives, the choice of days to bid is no longer
straightforward, as no one choice is best for all cost realizations . Instead the contractor
minimizes the expected cost as in (4), including the \opportunity cost" cUdb of a forgone
higher A-part bid in this calculation.
Ex-Post Eciency: Now that we know how contractors bid their days, and how they
complete given the incentive structure induced by that choice, we are in a position to char-
acterize the conditions required for ex-post eciency of the various contract designs. The
simplest case is a lane rental. The social cost of delay is cS, so if the procurer sets cD = cS,
the contractor will internalize the social costs and complete in the socially ecient time.
Only slightly harder is the case of the standard contract. Consider the right panel of Figure 3,
which shows the marginal benet of delay for dierent realizations of . As you can see, given
the discontinuity in the incentive relation at dE, the contractor will end up completing the
contract in dE days in all cases. But this immediately proves that the standard contract is
not ex-post ecient, since eciency would require dierent completion times for the dierent
cost realizations. In fact, standard contracts will in general be inecient unless the project
engineer imposes such an unrealistic time dE that contractors will always complete early or
late. To rule out this case, we make an assumption:
Assumption 1 (Eciency may require adaptation) There exist L;H 2  such that
 c0(dE;L) < cS and  c0(dE;H) > cS.
All this says is that there are some favorable cost realizations for which social eciency
requires completion before dE, and some bad realizations which for which the socially optimal
completion time is late. Under this assumption, we can provide a general characterization
of ex-post ecient contract design:
11Proposition 1 (Ex-Post Eciency) If assumption 1 holds, in equilibrium:
(a) Lane rentals are ex-post ecient i cD = cS.
(b) I/D contracts are ex-post ecient i cI = cD = cS.
(c) Standard contracts are not ex-post ecient.
(d) A+B contracts are ex-post ecient i either cI = cU = cS  cD or cI  cU = cS = cD.
The rst three results follow the logic above. For A+B contracts, the contract designer
has the luxury of picking one of the incentives \incorrectly", either giving low positive
incentives, or overly high negative incentives. The reason for this is that the contractor
can correct the incentive structure herself by bidding the right number of days, and indeed
this is what happens in equilibrium. This may be of practical importance, since highway
construction ocials are often reluctant to oer positive incentives for budgetary reasons.5
Ex-post ecient outcomes can be achieved without positive incentives by either lane rentals
or A+B bidding, if appropriately designed.
Analysis of Bidding: To complete the analysis, we consider how a contractor should bid
in the auction. Dene the pseudo-cost Pi(x) of a contractor with private signal x as their
expectation of the sum of their private costs, their incentive payments and the B-part of the
score, given that they complete in the optimal time as in proposition 1 and bid the number
of days optimally as in proposition 2. Formally, it is:
Pi(x) = E

c(d
a;) + IP(d
a;d
b
i(x);) + cUd
b
i(x)jx

(5)
This is analogous to the pseudo-value of Asker and Cantillon (2008b), and indeed from
Theorem 1 of their paper, all equilibrium outcomes of the full scoring auction can be obtained
by looking at equilibrium outcomes of the standard lowest-bid auction where contractors have
costs equal to their pseudo-costs. With that insight, the following result comes easily:
Proposition 2 (Bidding and Ex-Ante Eciency) In any equilibrium:
(a) The strategies take the form i(x) = (si(x)   cUdb
i(x);db
i(x)), where si(x) satises the
rst-order condition
si(x) = Pi(x) +
1
P
j6=i hj(s)
5This thinking is in some sense wrongheaded, since the procurer will have to pay for any time incentives
oered, regardless of how they are structured; but it may come out of a dierent budget.
12where hj(s) is the hazard function of the distribution of scores submitted by bidder j,
and Pi(x) is bidder i's pseudo-cost.
(b) If the equilibrium is symmetric and the contract is ex-post ecient, it is also ex-ante
ecient. Standard contracts will be ex-ante ecient in symmetric equilibria if cD = cS.
The intuition for the rst part is that the single-dimensional pseudo-cost completely summa-
rizes the total expected costs of a winning contractor, and that this is just a standard rst
price auction with the pseudo-cost replacing the cost. Simple algebra then yields the rst or-
der condition. For the ex-ante eciency results, notice that if the equilibrium is symmetric,
the bidder with the lowest pseudo-cost will win the auction. If the contract design is ex-post
ecient, this is the welfare maximizing allocation, since the pseudo-costs correspond closely
to the welfare function. On the other hand, standard contracts are not ex-post ecient, but
if the daily damages are set equal to the daily social cost, the scoring rule at least weights
time appropriately, so that the contract is allocated to the right bidder.
4 Empirical Analysis
The theory outlined above indicates how contracts should be designed in order to maximize
social welfare. In the remainder of the paper, we analyze data from contracts let by the
Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT). Our dataset is unusually rich, as it
includes detailed data on both standard contracts and the newer A+B contracts. This en-
ables us to examine two interesting questions. First, we present some descriptive evidence
on the bidding and outcomes in both standard and A+B contracts, showing that the predic-
tions of the theory are largely conrmed, although there are some interesting deviations that
may motivate a particular design. Second, we do some policy analysis based on counterfac-
tual welfare simulations, showing that large welfare gains can be achieved for a reasonable
increase in the Mn/DOT budget.
4.1 The Data
We have data from Mn/DOT on all the highway procurement contracts completed in Min-
nesota during the period 1997-2007. To get this dataset, we merged data from three main
13sources. The rst is the publicly available bidding abstracts, which detail who is letting the
contract (which level of government), what the contract is for, who bid and what amount they
bid, as well as the project engineer's initial cost estimate. This is formed by the Mn/DOT
project engineer based on the specied quantities for the project materials and \blue book"
prices for the various contract items. The cost estimate explains a large fraction of the
variation in the observed bids.6
The second source of data is data on the contract completion time. For a subset of completed
standard contracts (248 of them), Mn/DOT gave us the actual diary data used by Mn/DOT
project engineers to record contract progress. Using their own software, a program called
FieldOps, we measured both the total days actually taken on the contract and the days the
project engineer had allowed | thus deducing whether the contract was completed early
or late. Most contracts are \working day" contracts, in which it is the responsibility of the
project engineer to count the number of \working days" used by the contractor, to assess
whether he is late and decide whether to charge (liquidated) damages. This allows the
project engineer to make allowances for unforeseeable construction delays. Given this, the
contract days in the bidding abstract don't match observed outcomes all that well, and the
diary data is crucial for the analysis.
Our nal data source is A+B contract data, which we got from Mn/DOT's oce of construc-
tion and innovative contracting. This contract design has typically only been used on highly
time-sensitive projects, and so there are only 29 such contracts, with 123 bids placed in the
auctions. Here we we observe all the bids (both the A-part and the B-part), the identity of
the bidders, the scoring rule and the incentives cI and disincentives cD. In addition there are
some other features not captured in the formal model, such as a minimum number of days to
bid in some contracts; and capped positive incentives in others. For 23 of the A+B contracts
we also observe the nal completion time (the remaining contracts are still outstanding).
We present summary statistics on the standard contracts in Table 1, focusing on the contracts
for which we have diary data, since these are extensively used in the analysis. A typical
contract has value just over $1 million. The winning bid is 94.4%, on average of the engineer's
estimate, though the average bid is higher at 106.7% of the engineer's estimate. It is clear
that the diary subsample is not representative of the full set of Mn/DOT contracts, which
are on average twice as big at $2 million. We will try correct for this in the policy analysis.
6A linear regression of all of the bids in our data on the cost estimate alone has an R2 of 0.97.
14These contracts are of relatively short duration, on average 34 days. Contracts are generally
completed on time, although in the event that they are completed late, damages are assessed
in only 29% of cases. This is because the project engineer has discretion over when to assess
penalties. Damages range from nothing to as high as 1.05% of contract value. Time penalties
or damages are specied in the standard Minnesota contract specications, as detailed in
Table 2. For example, in a typical $1M contract, the penalty for being a day late is $1000.
Also in Table 2, we present detailed summary statistics on completion time. Smaller contracts
are more likely to nish early or on time than larger contracts. In fact, none of the contracts
of size less than $50 000 nish late, perhaps reecting the fact that the penalties in these
contracts are a larger fraction of the total contract value.
Some summary statistics on A+B auctions are presented in Table 3. These contracts are
much larger, of average value $11 million and estimated duration 151 days. Notice that these
contracts do indeed get completed earlier than specied: on average the winner bids only 123
days, and typically nishes early, earning average incentive payments of $41600 per contract.
There are four basic kinds of incentive structure that are observed in the A+B data: (i) those
with no positive incentives, and equal user cost and disincentive (0 = cI < cU = cD); (ii)
those with small positive incentives (0 < cI < cU = cD); (iii) those with entirely equal
incentives and disincentives (0 < cI < cU = cD); and (iv) those with user cost higher than
the other incentives (cU > cI = cD > 0). We will see how these dierent incentives aect
bidder behavior in what follows.
4.2 Bidding Behavior
To start, we look at the days bid in A+B contracts, as shown in the left panel of Figure 4.
The theory predicts that bidders should bid fewer days when positive incentives are lower
than disincentives, so as to \lock-in" the gains to nishing early. In fact it makes the strong
prediction that with cI < cU = cD, the optimal bid is db  d, the lowest days they could
possible want to complete in. In the data, we see that weaker incentives are correlated with
lower days bid, as predicted. Also, in the one contract in which usercosts were set above
the disincentive, many contractors actually phoned Mn/DOT and enquired if they could bid
zero days as is optimal. They were told that they could not, as their bids could be rejected
as \irregular", but we see that they bid a low number of days (look at the triangles).
To conrm that there is a statistically signicant dierence in bidding behavior, we run a
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Figure 4: Bidding and Competion in A+B Contracts. This left panel shows how the
number of days bid varies with the incentive structure. The right panel depicts how the nal days
taken relates to the days bid, for varying incentive structures.
tobit regression of days bid (as a percentage of the maximum allowed) on dummies for the
dierent incentive structures.7 A tobit is used to account for the censoring of days bid both
below (at the minimum days) and above (at the maximum days). The outcome is shown
in the rst column of Table 4. We nd that relative to the case with equal incentives (the
omitted group), the days bid is around 15% lower with zero incentives or a higher usercost.
The dummy for small positive incentives has no statistically signicant eect.
Next, we look the days taken relative to days bid (right panel of Figure 4). The theory
predicts that with zero or small positive incentives, the contractors should almost always
nish late (since they bid db  d). In fact with small incentives, the actual completion
time tends to be within 10% of the days bid, and often early. This would make sense if the
incentive structure were given ex-ante, as in the standard contracts, since the wedge between
incentives and disincentives should produce \stickiness" around db. But in A+B contracts,
the contractor should have bid such a low db such that nishing late is almost inevitable.
This may indicate that the bidders are not bidding days as the theory predicts. By contrast,
the theory has nothing to say about the case with equal incentives, but the data shows that
contractors bid up the days and nish early with certainty, thus earning incentive payments.
The fully theoretically equivalent strategy of bidding low days, increasing the A-bid, nishing
late and paying out damages is not chosen.
7We treat the incentive structure as exogenous, given the limited data.
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Figure 5: Bid Manipulation in Standard Contracts. The gure shows the relative fre-
quency of bids around the thresholds at which liquidated damages increase in standard contracts.
In the left panel we show bids around $25000; in the right panel, we have bids around $100 000.
Time incentives in standard contracts are weaker, but they still appear to play a role in
bidding. The damage specications depend on the nal value of the contract, given by the
winning bid. Damages increase across pre-dened thresholds. For example, one threshold
is at $25000 so a contract worth $24900 attracts damages of $150 per day; while a contract
worth $25100 attracts damages of $300 a day. In theory this gives incentives to contractors
to bid just below these thresholds, so that in the event they win, their potential damages are
lower. Figure 5 shows does actually occur. Both panels show histograms of the frequency
of bids on either side of a threshold ($25 000 in the left panel, $100 000 in the right), as
well as local linear regressions smoothing the frequencies on either side. It is clear that bids
immediately to the left of the threshold are far more frequent than those to the right. The
gap is particularly clear for low contract values; as contract values increase, the gap tends
to get smaller. The joint hypothesis that the density is continuous across the thresholds is
formally rejected, which suggests that contractors do pay attention to the time incentives.8
To conclude the bidding analysis, we look at the actual dollar bid across standard and A+B
8The formal test is given in McCrary (2008), and has a test statistic based on the dierence between the
smoothed frequencies at the threshold itself. As is typical of nonparametric tests, the result is sensitive to
bandwidth specication, and so we focus more on graphs themselves.
17contracts. In column 2 of Table 4 we show the results of an OLS regression of markup
over the engineer's estimate (i.e. bid / engineer's estimate) on the log engineer estimate,
disincentives and incentives (both as a fraction of estimate) plus dummies for the main task
on the contract and the district it was in. The results show that markups over engineer's
estimate signicantly increase with the disincentives, and decrease with the incentives. This
is exactly what the theory would predict.
4.3 Completion Times and Incentives
Now we consider how the incentive structure impacts the nal completion time. Recall that
our theory predicts that contract completion time will be \sticky" around dE in standard
contracts, so that many contracts will be completed exactly on time. Look at the left panel
of Figure 6, which is a histogram of the days late across contracts. In the gure, a contract
exactly on time has been added to the bin to the left of 0, and so you can see that over 20%
of the contracts were completed either just on time or a day early. This is exactly what the
theory predicts: at exactly the time when the penalties kick in, contractors choose to nish
their work. This is a strong validation of the theory.
We end with a basic question: do high powered time incentives yield quicker contract comple-
tion? The right panel of Figure 6 sheds light on this. A+B contracts are generally completed
much faster than the engineer's estimate, and where both large positive incentives and dis-
incentives are given, the contractor typically earns the maximum possible bonus (\capped
incentives"). There does not appear to be an obvious dierence between the contracts with
no positive incentives and those where positive incentives were given. By contrast, standard
contracts are often late.
To look at this more formally, we ran an OLS regression of days taken (as a fraction of
the maximum days) on the relative disincentives and positive incentives. Recall that for
A+B contracts, disincentives are almost always equal to user costs, so the disincentives are
a measure of user costs for those contracts.9 The results are reported in column 3 of Table 4.
We see that the stronger the time incentives, in the form of high usercosts/disincentives, the
quicker the contract is completed. By contrast, the presence of positive incentives has no
statistically signicant eect on completion time, which is as the theory predicts | the actual
9There is only one case in which the two are not equal, and that contract is removed for the purposes of
this regression.
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Figure 6: Completion Times and Incentives. The histogram in the left panel is of the
dierence between actual and contractually specied completion time in standard contracts. The
huge spike just before 0 indicates many contracts are completed exactly on time, as the theory
predicts. The right panel shows how the completion time varies across standard and A+B contracts.
days taken should be constant in expectation across incentive structures with cI  cU = cD.
This regression is meant to be primarily descriptive, as the OLS approach does not account
for the clustering of contracts at 0 seen in Figure 6. We will take account of these econometric
issues in the structural model below. But it does suggest that higher powered time incentives
do speed up contract completion.
Overall, the predictions of the theory stand up well. An important deviation from the theory
is that bidders on A+B contracts do not bid an unreasonably low number of days when there
are no positive incentives. This is possibly because they do not understand the game, or
more likely because they are concerned that their bid will be rejected as irregular. This
implies that the incentive structure with zero positive incentives will generally not deliver
ex-post eciency, even if the user cost is set equal to true social costs, because contractors
will not respond to positive cost shocks by completing early. On the other hand, with equal
incentives, the mechanism is \strategy-proof" in an intuitive way: the number of days bid has
no important implications for ex-post behavior. This suggests that designing A+B contracts
to provide equal positive and negative incentives contracts may be desirable in practice.
195 Policy Analysis
The central contention of the paper is that building time incentives into highway procurement
contracts could yield large social welfare gains. To assess this, we need to evaluate the
counterfactual welfare of both producers and commuters when contracts are re-designed to
incorporate explicit time incentives. Our strategy for doing this is as follows. First, we
estimate the contractor's private costs by looking at how their behavior changes as damages
vary across contracts. To do this, we use rst order conditions motivated directly by our
theoretical model. Second, we build measures of commuter user costs, using a methodology
very similar to that used by the engineers at Mn/DOT. With these in hand, we consider
simple counterfactual policy changes in we introduce lane rentals, which as we saw earlier
have a relatively simple ecient design. Of particular interest is a realistic case in which the
lane rental is a constant fraction of the user-cost, which turns out to be constrained ecient
when the owner (in this case Mn/DOT) faces budget constraints.
5.1 Estimating Contractor Costs
We estimate the contractor's private costs by looking at their behavior as damages vary
in standard contracts. We focus on standard contracts because damages are exogenously
specied at the state level, whereas in A+B contracts there is a concern that the incentive
structure is endogenous. Since our diary data subsample consists of only 248 contracts, it
is not possible for us to use a completely exible, nonparametric approach when analyzing
the impact of penalties on project completion times. We will use a parametric model in our
estimation.
The idea behind our estimation approach is to use the rst order conditions from the theory
model developed in the earlier sections. This will allow us to account explicitly for the
discontinuity in incentives as the contractor moves from \early" to \late", which produce a
mass of on time completions, as seen in Figure 6.10 The rst order conditions must satisfy:
 c
0(d;) = 0 if d < d
E (6)
 c
0(d;) = cD if d > d
E (7)
0 <  c0(d;) < cD if d = d
E (8)
10A similar econometric approach was taken in Reiss and White (2005).
20These are easily interpreted as saying that rms only complete early when their marginal
benets to delay reach zero; only complete late when their marginal benets to delay equal
the cost of delay cD, and otherwise complete on time.11
In specifying the marginal benet of delay function for any given contract, we need to account
for contract heterogeneity. A natural way to homogenize the contracts is to assume that the
marginal benets of delay scale with the project engineer's estimate of contract duration.
This seems reasonable, as the project engineer's estimate is based on extensive analysis of
the project specications, and explains over 90% of the variation in days taken in our data.
Formally, suppose that the contractor's cost function is homogenous of degree 1 (i.e. a
contract of twice the size, completed in twice the days, costs twice as much). It immediately
follows that the marginal benet of delay will be homogenous of degree 0.12 Then if the cost
shocks scale with contract duration, we have for an arbitrary contract:
 c
0(d;) =  c
0(
d
dE;

dE) =  c
0(e d;e ) = 0 + 1e d +e  (9)
where e d = d=dE; and e  = =dE is assumed to have normal distribution with mean zero and
standard deviation 2. This a very simple and parsimonious specication | linear marginal
benet and normal errors | but it turns out to t the data quite well, and is appropriate
given the limited number of observations in our sample. We have experimented with other
specications, but they have not contributed to t.
We proceed by maximum likelihood. The log likelihood for each observation, `i(e ) is:
`i(e ) =
8
> > > <
> > > :
log



 0 1 e d


  log() ; e d < 1
log



(cD=dE) 0 1 e d


  

 0 1 e d


; e d = 1
log



(cD=dE) 0 1 e d


  log() ; e d > 1
(10)
where  and  denote the standard normal pdf and cdf respectively. The likelihood function
is very similar to that of a censored tobit, except that instead of having a mass point on one
side at the point of censoring, we have a mass point at on-time completion, e d = 1.
We allow the error standard deviation  to vary with the contract size, specifying that  is
11We assume that rms believe the damages will be charged with certainty. If in fact they believe they
will only be imposed some fraction of the time, this methodology will overestimate the private costs, and is
thus conservative in assessing welfare gains to improved contract design.
12See for example Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green (1995), Theorem M.B.1.
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Figure 7: Fit of the Timing Model The gure shows kernel density estimates of the normalized
completion times d= d for both the actual and data simulated from the structural model.
a linear function of the log contract size. This is motivated by the observation that in the
data, even after normalizing through by the engineer's days estimate, smaller contracts have
more variable outcomes. We have also experimented with more complicated specications,
including additional covariates, but they are generally insignicant. We trim the top and
bottom 5% of observations, which amounts to contracts where the contract was completed
in less than 30% of the allotted time, or more than 153% of the allotted time. This allows
for a much better t. To obtain standard errors, we bootstrap the ML procedure.
Our results are in Table 5. For an average contract, which lasts 37.4 days, we estimate the
marginal benet of delay to be 18895 510d, a line that reaches zero just before the allotted
completion time.13 In other words, we predict absent any negative shocks, contractors will
complete slightly early. This is both consistent with the data and the fact that contractors
typically build a little \contingency" time into their project plans. We nd that the marginal
benet of delay is initially positive, but decreasing in days, as assumed in the theory. We nd
also that larger contracts have smaller cost shocks, relative to the number of days assigned
to the contract. To assess t, it is useful to compare some sample and predicted moments.
In the data, 29.5% of the contracts nish late, and conditional on being late, they nish
15.7% over the days allotted. The model matches this data well, predicting that 34% of
contracts will nish late, and that they will nish 15.7% late, as in the data. This good t
is also evident from comparing the kernel density plots of the normalized completion times
against those simulated from the structural model, as in Figure 7.
13Due to the trimming, the average contract size is slightly higher than that reported in Table 1.
225.2 Estimating User Costs
We next construct measures of road user costs for the roads under construction in 167 of the
contracts.14 This is necessary because Mn/DOT generally only calculates user costs for A+B
projects, or where they have been asked to evaluate the costs of a delay in construction. We
develop an estimate of the daily user cost for those contracts as follows:
User Costt = Delayt  Time V aluet  Traffict (11)
The daily user cost is estimated as the per user delay (in hours), times the time value for the
average commuter (in $/hour), times the average daily trac on that road. In this we follow
closely the actual Mn/DOT methodology for computing user costs. Their methodology
accounts also for additional wear and tear in the case where commuters are re-routed, and
for the possibility of cars with multiple occupancy. By neglecting these factors, we hope to
get conservative user cost estimates.
The rst element that we need to calculate is the average delay due to the construction
project. In practice, this depends on whether the project engineer decides to close down
lanes but still leave the road open, or to close the road and detour commuters. Whenever
the road is left open, commuters must slow down, and Mn/DOT generally assumes that
their commuting speed over that section is cut in half. On the other hand, if rerouted, the
detour is generally longer than the original route, and that also causes delays. The decision
of whether to reroute or close lanes is spelled out in the project plans, and so Mn/DOT uses
this information when calculating user costs. Since we do not have access to the information,
we take a conservative stance, computing the minimum of these two alternatives.
To do this, for each contract where the location data allows us to pinpoint it on a map,
we use google maps to outline the construction zone, and its length (see the left panel of
Figure 8). We then use google to calculate a travel time for that route. If the route is left
open, we assume that the travel time will double, which means the delay will be equal to the
original travel time. We also do our best to construct a likely detour around that section of
the road, as in the right panel of Figure 8. We then use google to estimate the time required
to drive the detour, getting a delay estimate as the dierence between the travel times. In
14We have gone to considerable eort to get this data: for the remaining contracts, Mn/DOT themselves no
longer appear to have easily available copies of the original plans indicating the location of the construction,
which is necessary to compute the user costs.
23Figure 8: Delay Calculations: The left panel shows the locations of the highway construction
projects used in the counterfactual. The right panel shows an example of a detour calculation
around a section of route 6.
practice, Mn/DOT does a less-virtual version of this exercise, actually sending personnel to
drive the detour and original route at dierent times of day and record the data. Overall
then, delays are calculated as:
Delayt = MinfTravel timet;Detour Timet   Travel timetg
To get an estimate of the daily trac, we use trac volume measures from Mn/DOT at
each location in the dataset.15 For a measure of the time value, we use the rate of $12/hour,
which is the rate used in the Mn/DOT calculations. We throw out one outlier with a usercost
estimate of over $600 000 per day. We summarize all these measures, including the usercost
we compute, in Table 6. The estimated average delay is 9.11 minutes, which with around
18550 daily commuters on a typical road results in an average daily usercost of $15626.
5.3 Counterfactuals
Now that we have contractor costs and social benets, we consider three counterfactual
changes. First, a change in which Mn/DOT charges a lane rental equal to the current
damages specied in standard contracts (see Table 2). This aects all contracts of a given
size equally. Next, we consider two policies that are more contract specic: one in which
15See http://www.dot.state.mn.us/trac/data/html/volumes.html
24the Mn/DOT assesses a lane rental equal to 10% of the estimated usercost, and another in
which the lane rental is equal to the estimated usercost. The former policy is constrained
ecient, in that it is the best policy subject to the requirement that the required increase in
the Mn/DOT budget is less than a given amount (in this case $17573 a contract or at 370
contracts a year, $6.5 million a year).16 The latter policy is the ecient contract design.17
The procedure for obtaining the counterfactual estimates is as follows. First, we calculate
the mean counterfactual completion times for each contract by simulating draws from the
cost shock distribution, and then computing the mean optimal completion time under the
new incentives. Then we calculate the additional private costs incurred by the contractor |
since he will now complete earlier | under the estimated parameters of the time cost model.
This by itself is enough for welfare analysis, since we can compare the social gains from the
average reduction in user costs to the private cost increase faced by the contractor.
But it will also be interesting to estimate the cost to Mn/DOT of implementing this policy.
To get a sense of how costly actually implementing this policy would be, we compute a net
cost to Mn/DOT as:
Cost Mn/DOTt = (Private Costst + Damagest)  1:2   Damagest (12)
where the multiplier 1:2 is a bidding markup, chosen to be reasonably conservative (compare
it, for example, with the markup of the average bidder over engineer's cost of 1.07). This
formula accounts for the fact that bidders will mark up both their expected damages and
higher private costs, so that Mn/DOT will be a net loser on the lane rentals it collects.
One concern is that the subsample of contracts for which we have user cost data is not
representative of the contracts undertaken in the state of Minnesota as a whole. To address
this, we use propensity score re-weighting. First, we estimate the probability that a contract
is in the subsample given key observables like contract size, district, government authority,
type of contract (e.g. bridge-building) and primary material used (e.g. asphalt, concrete).
16Maximizing the social welfare function subject to a budget constraint | payments to contractors less
rentals less than some B | yields a rst order condition under which the ratio of usercosts across two projects
must be equal to the ratio of the expected marginal benets of contractor delay. Under our specications,
contractor optimization leads to the the RHS of this expression being equal to the ratio of the per day rental
rates, implying that the constrained ecient policy is to set the rental rates as a constant fraction of the
usercosts across all contracts, where the fraction is determined by the budget.
17For bigger changes, we are leaning more heavily on our parametric specication to recover estimates of
the contractor's private costs, and so the results from this last case should be viewed with some caution.
25This is done using a probit on the full sample of contracts in Minnesota (3702 contracts).
Second, we weight the relevant counterfactual statistics for each observation in the subsample
by the inverse of the estimated probability of inclusion. If the unobservables have the same
distribution across the full sample and subsample, this will correct for selection.
The results are in Tables 7 and 8. In the rst table, we see that introducing lane rentals
at current damages reduces the average number of days taken from 33.9 to 32.5; while a
lane rental of 10% of usercost reduces the mean completion time to 31.8 days. The ecient
design has a strong eect, creating incentives for contractors to complete in only 18.9 days.
The estimated private time reduction costs under the status quo are small, on average $499
with an average contract size of around $1 million, suggesting the current time incentives
are weak. Under the rst counterfactual policy, these are estimated to rise to $1712.8, and
all the way to $138543.9 under the ecient lane rentals. In all counterfactuals, the damages
increase dramatically, because the contractor must start paying damages from the moment
the contract starts. The re-weighted results are remarkably similar, which is re-assuring
since it suggests that the counterfactual subsample is reasonably similar to the full sample.
What are the changes in producer costs and user welfare? The magnitudes are striking! From
the re-weighted results, the smaller lane rental policy improves user welfare by $26676 per
contract, at a cost to producers of only $1217, for a net welfare gain of $25459 per contract.
The more aggressive policies have even larger eects, since they tie incentives directly to
the cost to commuters. The 10% usercost lane rental improves net welfare by $163808 per
contract, and the ecient policy yields net gains of $388653 per contract. This is around
19.4% of contract value, or in terms of the Mn/DOT budget around $310M a year.18
The problem is of course that the fully ecient policy would be extremely costly to Mn/DOT,
raising the issue of whether taxpayers would be willing to foot the bill. We estimate the
cost at $199000 per contract, or about 10% more. Instead, the constrained ecient policy of
setting lane rentals at 10% of usercost may be a good practical policy proposal. The expected
funding increase there is only $17573 per contract, or less than 1%. Compare this with the
expected gains to users of around 8.5% per contract. The huge gap between the costs and
benets comes from matching incentives to usercosts. Providing high-powered incentives on
high usercost projects really speeds them up, sometimes at little cost to the contractor, as in
the case when he draws favorable cost shocks. The current incentives in standard contracts
18The Mn/DOT budget for 2009 is $1.69B. Source: Minnesota Transportation Appropriations for 2008-9
(http://www.house.leg.state.mn.us/hrd/as/85/as143.html)
26are both low-powered and \one-size ts all", which does little to aid commuters 19
Despite our best eorts, there are missing elements in the above counterfactual analysis. On
one hand, we ignore the fact that under the new contract regime, contractors may be selected
for on the basis of their ability to complete quickly, and therefore the winning bidders may
actually have lower costs than those we estimated earlier. Moreover, they may make dierent
decisions with respect to the hiring of labor and rental of capital than they currently do,
enabling them to complete quicker without incurring the high costs we project when we hold
labor and capital decisions xed. These suggests we underestimate welfare gains.
On the other hand, with accelerated contracts and high-powered incentives comes increased
need for monitoring the contractors. This is costly, since Mn/DOT would have to employ
additional personnel on site. Similarly, if contractors are risk averse, time incentives increase
contract risk and they will bid higher. In that sense we underestimate the costs to Mn/DOT.
One more caveat is that we do not account for general equilibrium eects due to the bidding
up of input prices | if one of these policy changes were implemented throughout Minnesota
construction, one might expect that construction labor costs would rise as the premium to
quick completion rose. Nor do we account for the deadweight loss of additional taxation
needed to nance these time incentives. Nonetheless, the projected welfare gains are so large
even under conservative assumptions and sub-optimal policy changes that it seems unlikely
that our conclusions will be reversed by accounting for these eects.
6 Conclusion
This paper has shown that building time incentives into highway procurement contracts
is important from the perspective of social welfare. From a theoretical perspective, we
have shown that the A + B scoring auctions used by Mn/DOT and other agencies can be
used to achieve ecient ex-ante allocations and ex-post outcomes, provided the incentives
are correctly set. We have provided a characterization of the optimal incentive structure.
Taking this theory to a rich dataset, we have found evidence that suggests that setting equal
incentive and disincentive ex-post payments may achieve the best outcomes in practice.
We have also shown that the standard highway procurement contracts are generally ex-post
19That said, the few A+B contracts that have been used are a step in the right direction, as they do
exactly what we suggest | provide high powered incentives on high usercost contracts.
27inecient, and thus that contract completion time might change if stronger time incentives
were provided. Results from our counterfactual model demonstrate that there are large social
gains to increased time incentives. We conclude that increasing the time incentives provided
to contractors through careful auction and contract design would improve social welfare.
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297 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1: Taking the FOC of the prot function (b;da;db;) with respect to da
yields that  c0(da;) = I(da;db). Then since  c(d;) is strictly decreasing and I(da;db) is
increasing, there is a unique solution for given (db;), implying da(db;) is a function. The
comparative static follows from the FOC since I(da;db) is decreasing in db if cI < cD, and
constant otherwise.
Proof of Lemma 2: In the case where cI = cU = cD, da does not depend on db. Simplify-
ing (4), we get E [c(da;)   cuda], independent of db, so indierence follows. If cI < cU = cD
it suces to show db
i(x)  d weakly optimal for all realizations of  and strongly optimal
sometimes. Fix  and compare the payos to db
i(x) = 0 versus any deviation d0. There are
two possibilities. Either d0  da(d0;) in which case the contractor will complete early late
both on-path and in the deviation, with zero payo dierence. Or d0 > da(d0;) in which
case the contractor completes early in the deviation and late on-path, with payo dierence
cUd0 cI(d0 da(d0;)) cDda(db;) > 0, so bidding db is strictly better. Finally, by denition
of d, it will sometimes be the case that d0 > da(d0;) if d0 > d. The case with cI = cU < cD
is similar. Finally, the comparative statics results follow directly from (4).
Proof of Proposition 1: Ex-post eciency requires that da = d, where d solves  c0(d;) =
cS. For lane rentals, we have  c0(da;) = cD, so cD = cS is both necessary and suf-
cient for the result. In I/D contracts with cI = cD, the optimal completion time sets
 c0(da;) = cD = cI, so cS = cI = cD suces. It is also necessary, since by assumption
1, there exists L with  c0(dE;) < cS, so for ecient completion cI = cS. Similarly the
existence of H implies we must have cD = cS, and the necessity follows. Standard contracts
are a special case of the I/D contract with cI = 0 < cD, and so are immediately ex-post
inecient. Finally, for A+B contracts, if cI < cU = cS = cD, by proposition 2, the bidder
will bid db  d and by denition of d complete on time or late, so  c0(da;) = cD = cS is
sucient for eciency. Similar logic gives suciency for cI = cU = cS  cD. For neces-
sity notice that certainly either cD or cI must equal cS, or the completion time will not be
ecient. Moreover, if this holds and cI < cU < cD, then by proposition 2 the contractor
bids db 2 (d;d). By denition of (d;d), there are realizations of  for which the contractor
wants to complete early, and some late, and then since cS cannot equal both cI and cD, the
completion time is inecient.
Proof of Proposition 2: The objective function faced by a bidder with signal xi is to
30maximize E

(b;db;da;)jxi

j6=i (1   Gj(s)), where Gj(s) is the equilibrium distribution
of rival j's scores. Substituting in the optimal number of days and simplifying, we get
the standard objective function in an FPA (s   Pi(x))j6=i (1   Gj(s)) with the score s
replacing the bid b and the pseudo-cost Pi(x) taking the place of the cost. The FOC follows
directly from taking a derivative in s in the objective function. For (b), if the contract
is ex-post ecient, the pseudo-cost simplies to E [c(da;) + dacS] plus a constant that is
equal across bidders, and then by inspecting the welfare function it is clear that the bidder
with the lowest pseudo-cost maximizes expected social welfare. If the bidding strategies are
symmetric, the winner has the lowest pseudo-cost, and so the result follows. For standard
contracts, if cD = cS then again the bidder with the lowest pseudo-cost maximizes expected
social welfare.
Table 1: Summary Statistics: Bidding and Outcomes for Standard Contracts
Diary Data Available No Diary Data
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max Mean
Engineer's Estimate 1085825 1574707 8869 11388853 2000276
Bid 1131726 1649215 7954.34 12979986 2094701
Markup 1.067 0.224 0.394 1.993 1.071
Winning Bid 1025031 1489726 7954 9549736 1938585
Winning Markup 0.944 0.175 0.394 1.462 0.964
Days Allowed 34.101 25.493 3 141 |
Days Taken 33.415 27.018 0.5 136.3 |
Prob. Enforced 0.290 0.458 0 1 |
Total Damages 714.18 3061.76 0 27000 |
Total Damages (% of EngEst) 0.174 0.135 0 1.05 |
N 762 762 762 762 6142
Means and standard deviations on rm-level variables are re-weighted to avoid oversampling contracts with
many bidders.
31Table 2: Damage Specications and Time Outcomes for Standard Contracts
Damages per Day ($) Time Outcomes
Contract Value ($) 1995{2004 2005- # Obs Avg. Days Late % Late
Below 25K 75 150 7 -6.4 0
25K-50K 125 300 5 -2.6 0
50K-100K 250 300 19 -3.7 15.8
100K-500K 500 600 64 -2.7 20.3
500K-1M 750 1000 30 2.7 50.0
1M-2M 1250 1500 35 -1.37 37.1
2M-5M 1750 2000 15 3.37 53.3
5M-10M 2500 3000 7 3.4 57.1
Over 10M 3000 3500 0 | |
The contract value is equal to the winning bid in the auction.
Table 3: Summary Statistics: Bidding and Outcomes for A+B Contracts
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Engineer's Estimate 11546182 18847279 618947 99154104
Maximum Days 154.37 242.81 15 1067
Usercost 10858.20 7342.00 3000 28000
Daily Incentives 5093.50 4117.06 0 10000
Daily Disincentives 10858.20 7726.10 3000 30000
No positive incentives (%) 34.5 | | |
Small positive incentives (%) 10.3 | | |
Equal incentives (%) 51.7 | | |
Higher usercost (%) 3.5 | | |
A-Bid ($) 13237849 22639349 601335 137423952
B-Bid (Days) 135.70 217.33 5 987
Markup (Bid / EngEst) 1.099 0.190 0.799 1.656
A-Bid of Winner 11861851 19844433 601335 102843344
B-Bid of Winner 122.34 193.14 6 987
Winning Markup 1.002 0.136 0.799 1.386
Total Incentive Payment 40926.09 63244.39 -30000 250000
N 123 123 123 123
Means and standard deviations on rm-level variables are re-weighted to avoid oversampling contracts with
many bidders. \No positive incentives" means 0 = cI < cU = cD, \Small positive incentives" means
0 < cI < cU = cD, \Equal Incentives" means cI = cU = cD, and \Higher usercost" means cI = cD < cU.
32Table 4: Descriptive Regressions
Days Bid $ Bid Days Taken
(fraction of Max) (fraction of estimate) (fraction of Max)
No positive incentives -0.1523
(0.0745)
Small positive incentives 0.0930
(0.0615)
Higher usercost -0.1963
(0.0516)
Log Engineer Estimate 0.0166
(0.0051)
Disincentives / EngEst 49.3047 -38.2252
(6.8859) (18.8496)
Incentives / EngEst -34.8935 15.7458
(7.0540) (20.6784)
Bridge Dummy 0.0241 0.0239
(0.0108) (0.0630)
Grading Dummy 0.0320 -0.0158
(0.0121) (0.0740)
Milling Dummy -0.0025 0.0613
(0.0105) (0.0659)
Trac Control Dummy -0.0331 -0.0902
(0.0140) (0.0733)
District FE no yes yes
R2 | 0.0848 0.0845
N 123 6635 270
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by contract. The rst column is of a modied tobit,
used because of censoring at the minimum and at the maximum days bid. The excluded group is equal
incentives and disincentives; and the data is only from A+B auctions (where there is bidding on days). In
the second and third columns regression is by OLS, and xed eects by district and the primary task in the
contract are included. All bids are used in column 2. In column 3, only the diary subsample plus the A+B
contracts are used, since we only have timing data for these contracts.
33Table 5: Completion Time
Estimated Cost Function for Average Contract ( 37 days)
Variable Coecient Standard Error
0 18895.2 3445.5
1 -510.12 93.3
 4317.9 943.4
Marginal Eect: Log Contract Size on  -572.7 266.9
Estimates of the marginal time cost function | the intercept 0 and slope 1 | and the shock standard
deviation , for an average contract. Standard errors obtained by bootstrapping.
Table 6: Summary Statistics: User Costs of Construction
Mean Standard Deviation Min Max
Delay (in minutes) 9.11 14.2 1 114
Trac (daily commuters) 18551.27 28254.01 300 160000
Estimated User Cost ($ per day) 15625.74 29425.39 56 274773.3
Table 7: Summary Statistics for Counterfactual Data
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
(re-weighted) (re-weighted)
No change
Days Taken 33.90 28.15 36.86 30.98
Private Time Reduction Costs 503.53 643.73 545.63 703.92
Damages Paid 2139.88 2785.60 2432.39 3142.15
Lane Rental = Current Damages
Days Taken 32.48 27.49 35.44 30.25
Private Time Reduction Costs 1720.84 2205.28 1833.03 2416.06
Damages Paid 50649.37 75307.33 57887.33 85427.21
Lane Rental = 10% of Usercost
Days Taken 31.81 28.20 34.71 31.29
Private Time Reduction Costs 7042.28 25348.10 7389.20 25053.41
Damages Paid 46470.12 91166.06 49237.40 91361.21
Lane Rental = Usercost (ecient policy)
Days Taken 18.92 26.56 21.55 29.66
Private Time Reduction Costs 136986.71 278635.19 145158.22 296037.69
Damages Paid 109651.47 260161.57 129759.57 286165.38
Counterfactual estimates of statistics of interest, for three counterfactual lane rental policies. Estimates are
from simulations based on a sample of 167 contracts where we have detailed trac and construction data.
The last two columns are constructed by re-weighting the outcomes by the inverse of their probability of
being included in the sample used for the counterfactual.
34Table 8: Counterfactual Welfare Measures
Mean Std Deviation Mean Std Deviation
(re-weighted) (re-weighted)
Lane Rental = Current Damages
 User Welfare 26676.01 61441.43 27842.03 62116.99
 Private Costs 1217.32 1581.65 1287.40 1729.95
 Cost to Mn/DOT 11162.68 16233.00 12635.87 18370.01
Lane Rental = 10% of Usercost
 User Welfare 146275.86 613484.89 170651.13 708984.20
 Private Costs 6538.75 25204.26 6843.56 24930.21
 Cost to Mn/DOT 16712.55 44688.17 17573.28 43338.79
Lane Rental = Usercost (ecient policy)
 User Welfare 501325.60 1316048.13 533265.56 1326104.65
 Private Costs 136483.18 278263.23 144612.59 295651.56
 Cost to Mn/DOT 185282.14 344444.12 199000.55 366089.41
Counterfactual estimates of welfare measures, for three counterfactual lane rental policies. Estimates are
from simulations based on a sample of 167 contracts where we have detailed trac and construction data.
The last two columns are constructed by re-weighting the outcomes by the inverse of their probability of
being included in the sample used for the counterfactual.
35